Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 6
Number 3 Volume 6, No. 3: Fall 2013

Article 4

Occam’s Follies: Real and Imagined Biases Facing Intelligence
Studies
Matthew Crosston
Bellevue University, matthew.crosston@moderndiplomacy.eu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 40-53
Recommended Citation

Crosston, Matthew. "Occam’s Follies: Real and Imagined Biases Facing
Intelligence Studies." Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 3 (2013) : 40-53.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3.4
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss3/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Digital
Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic
Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Occam’s Follies: Real and Imagined Biases Facing Intelligence
Studies
Abstract
More than a decade removed from 9/11 many across the academic and intelligence
communities profess the importance for greater collaboration and cooperation. This mutual
diffusion of knowledge, methods, and research would ideally produce both a stronger
Intelligence Studies discipline and new talented cadres for both communities. The
emphasis is not just logical because of the continued relevance of traditional threats, but is
also common sense when considering new challenges represented by emerging threat
issues and an oncoming demographic crisis: the fast-approaching retirement of the baby
boom generation means a new generation of scholars and practitioners is rising now.
Developing that new talent, however, has not been nearly as collaborative, cooperative, or
smooth as it could be. This analysis examines the problems preventing real engagement
and sincere knowledge diffusion between the academic and intelligence communities.
These problems go beyond platitudes about confidential materials and top secret
clearances, but hint at underlying prejudices on both sides that only exacerbate attitudinal
bias. If not overcome this problem threatens to undermine both the capabilities of future
Intelligence Community practitioners and the quality of academic community scholars
within Intelligence Studies.
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Introduction
More than a decade removed from 9/11, many across the academic and intelligence communities
profess a need for greater collaboration and cooperation. This mutual diffusion of knowledge,
methods, and research would ideally produce a stronger Intelligence Studies discipline in general
and new cadres of intelligence professionals more specifically. This article examines the
problems preventing real engagement and sincere knowledge diffusion between the academic
and intelligence communities. While improved interaction is common sense because of the
necessity in countering both traditional and emerging threats, there are significant obstacles
facing this collaboration. These problems go beyond platitudes about confidential materials and
top secret clearances and hint at underlying prejudices on both sides that only exacerbate bias.
More importantly, these issues are not just the legacy of a bygone era, perpetuated by an older
generation that just doesn’t understand the 21st century. They testify to serious problems that
exist when interaction remains limited and partnership is viewed through mutually skeptical
eyes. This skepticism pervades both the academic and intelligence communities, creating real
and imagined biases across analytical and anecdotal lines. This results in an attitudinal wedge
that can only be overcome if more intellectually open and less professionally hubristic attempts
to engage emerge from both sides. If these analytical and anecdotal issues are not overcome, then
they threaten to undermine not only the capabilities of future Intelligence Community
practitioners but could call into question the academic legitimacy of Intelligence Studies as a
discipline.

The Analytical Quandary: Formal Challenges to Cooperation within
Intelligence Studies
The following section offers insight on the formal intellectual barriers hindering practitionerscholar interaction within Intelligence Studies. Three aspects in particular are highlighted not
because they are the only problems facing the discipline but because of their basic importance
overall to how research is conducted and how the field looks not only at projects to pursue but
the methods and approaches used to pursue them. Emphasizing such elementary aspects exposes
the severity of the problem: if the ‘simple’ issues are in disharmony, then inevitably more
complex challenges only widen the gap between the two sides.
The West and the Rest

One of the increasingly relevant trends over the past several years has been an emphasis on the
‘Anglosphere.’ This is the contention that the West (which is itself dominated by the US and
UK) has a troubling tendency to both view intelligence from its own particular perspectives and
push a standardization of such views across the global community without truly analyzing how
well a ‘one-approach-fits-all’ method works.1 The consequences of this habit are quite damaging
and impact both purely theoretical scholarship and applied empirical field work. For example,
Western scholars of Intelligence Studies not only disagree on a single succinct conceptualization
of ‘intelligence,’ but many of those definitional varieties fail to address a non-Western reality.
The process of performing intelligence outside the Anglosphere is not an exclusively foreign
engagement domain, meaning serious domestic security concerns often become subsumed by
1
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intelligence organizations in such countries. This analytical oversight is relatively ignored by
both practitioners and academics alike. The Anglosphere, dominated by states mostly
uncomfortable with intelligence activity in domestic affairs, has subsequently dismissed such
interference as signs of internal corruption, domestic oppression, or democratic deformity. While
some of the cases outside of the Anglosphere can in fact be categorized thusly, the entire nonWestern intelligence world should not be painted with such a broad negative brush. Yet many
analysts and scholars do just that, thereby closing intelligence off from greater accuracy and
exposing it to a higher likelihood of analytical misjudgment.
On the one hand, intelligence scholars are too permissive with multiple definitions. This is to the
discipline’s detriment as the lack of consensus prohibits diverse research from communicating
with each other. This is no small matter as it is cross-communicating research which builds a
body of knowledge. On the other hand, they are inflexible when considering aspects of variation
not innate to the Anglosphere. This is despite the fact that the inclusion of non-Western domestic
factors has real empirical value and would increase the accuracy of intelligence research. Thus,
the definition problem is multi-layered: research is framed in a semi-disorganized manner,
caused by having too many definitions covering too few cases and there has been a reluctance to
embrace a non-Western intelligence reality.2
The consensus problems of scholars are equivalent to the framing problems of practitioners, as
empirical frames of analysis for field observations that exclude key information are just as
limiting as patch-work sets of definitions. Embracing intelligence as an exclusively foreignpolicy domain and not engaging domestic concerns, therefore, creates analyses that miss whole
swaths of information, pushed aside as internal security measures or law enforcement issues.
Again, for states outside the Anglosphere this is a false distinction: there is no relevant separation
between foreign policy objectives, national security priorities, and domestic regime concerns. All
of them encompass and influence the supreme priority: the power, position, and security of the
state. It matters little whether that is in the global system amongst regional neighbors or at the
local level dealing with domestic stability: intelligence is about gaining insight from information,
often by any means necessary.
Whether or not Western scholars and practitioners endorse such a viewpoint does not alter the
reality of how non-Western states do their intelligence business. Failing to engage them at their
level and on their terms provides a cautionary tale that explains how historic shifts can
sometimes be missed. This is different from the critiques of fine scholars like Richard Betts, who
thought many intelligence failures occurred simply because of too-lofty expectations, or Amy
Zegart, who believed meaningful reform could alter the institutional landscape of the intelligence
community, thereby making it more accurate and agile.3 Failure to overcome the aforementioned
conceptualization flaws, however, means that the concerns of Betts and Zegart can be addressed
while intelligence analysis still goes analytically astray. Most important here is how neither side
helps lead the other beyond their respective conceptual and observational road blocks. In
2
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essence, they stay out of each other’s way. Consequently, this cooperation failure produces
research that deforms the body of knowledge (a debilitating error for any emerging discipline)
and creates analyses blind to on-the-ground realities (a mortal wound for any intelligence brief).
The Dilemma of Under-theory

The ‘under-theorization’ of Intelligence Studies is not new. Nearly a half-century ago Klaus
Knorr broke it down perfectly:
“There is no satisfactory theory of intelligence – neither a descriptive theory that
describes how intelligence work is actually performed nor a normative theory that
attempts to prescribe how intelligence work should be conducted…There are beginnings
and fragments of such theories…but a fully developed theory or set of theories does not
exist. As long as [theory] is lacking, we have no criteria…for judging whether
intelligence work…is done well or badly or for specifying ways of improving it.”4
Discussions about how the lack of a cogent theory for intelligence has hurt not only academic
research but also practitioner analyses have existed for nearly a decade.5 While this problem
flows from the lack of definitional consensus and multiplicity of concepts discussed above, these
issues are not solely responsible: at present there are probably less than a handful of scholars
devoting any serious research time trying to advance the theoretical strength of Intelligence
Studies as a discipline. This is not so much about achieving a critical mass or trying to acquire a
specific numerical quota of scholars, but as long as the discipline exhibits a weak level of
commitment and curiosity to this issue it will not be ‘fully-theorized’ any time soon. This matters
because an academic discipline without theory will de facto become a simple storing house for
data, nothing more. It is the presence of theory that trains analysts and scholars alike to produce
information that is internally consistent, logically complete, and falsifiable. This training is what
allows us to move beyond simple descriptive inference and achieve more profound causal
relationships, which is essential to both communities within Intelligence Studies. Thus, theory is
not just an ivory tower conceit but needs to matter to practitioners as well.
It is of course no easy task to create rigorous and encompassing theory in a discipline that so
many still view as a largely applied field. It also does not help that much of the ‘practical’
analytical training done inside of many intelligence communities tends to view the ‘academic
rigor’ associated with theory as a luxury it rarely has time to afford. But the need to break down
this false scholar-practitioner barrier is essential for the proper development of Intelligence
Studies as a real discipline: the end goal would be applied theory that analyzes what scholars
look to investigate with rigor and captures what practitioners strive to encapsulate in succinct
briefings. One of the strongest contemporary voices to this need recently wrote:
“These questions – framed in an applied way – get at the core need for a theory of
intelligence analysis that explains why some intelligence analysis responsibilities shift
over time and why others remain constant. Without that theory, intelligence agencies will
inevitably shift resources to the highest threat and reduce resources devoted to other
4
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targets. In other words, to borrow an analogy, they will approach the subject matter of
intelligence analysis in the same way that five-year-olds play soccer: everybody runs to
the one spot on the field where the ball is, with no thought given to what happens when
the ball moves to another spot. This problem of managing resources is a direct outgrowth
of the inability to explain or predict these shifts in analytic coverage.”6
Breaking down this barrier is really about uniting empiricism with theory, which is a core
achievement for any legitimate social science inquiry. In essence, it is seeking answers that can
be both intellectually rigorous while being empirically accurate: something Intelligence Studies
should consider its Holy Grail. Unfortunately, at the moment, a false debate has been allowed to
fester as to what causes the lack of such theory: is it because Intelligence Studies is simply a field
that does not lend itself to theorizing or is it because not enough scholars have taken up the
drumbeat to work together with practitioners to develop it? This article posits that it is the latter
and not the former, which is why greater interactive communication becomes so crucial.
An important off-shoot of this comes from Robert Jervis. He has pushed for Intelligence Studies
to consider developing a variety of theories from many different perspectives. This to him is the
only way to tackle the unwieldy world of intelligence.7 This also carries with it the potential for
cross-discipline legitimation. If greater scholarly investment is made to combine the lessons of
Marrin and Jervis together, to devote more dedicated time uniting empirical reality with
theoretical power while allowing the discipline’s definitions and concepts to be flexible but still
accurate, then it seems imminently plausible that Intelligence Studies will not only improve its
intellectual grounding but will potentially be an analytical beacon for other disciplines suffering
from the same multi-faceted complexity (Human Security, Global Affairs, Energy Security, and
Military Studies come immediately to mind).
Finally, keeping faith with its applied nature and practitioner cogency, a suggestion made by
Marrin is likely crucial for the development of theory within intelligence studies:
“Perhaps intelligence studies will become more like military studies…as it continues to
develop its conceptual and theoretical foundations. Theorizing tends by its very nature to
be the product of academia, but over time the concepts developed in academia tend to
seep into the world of the practitioners and shape the approaches that are subsequently
taken. This is why the military has established its various centers of academic learning;
they provide a good place to study the practice of war, develop new concepts that are
then worked into new doctrine, which – once they are tested and proven effective – are
then taught to practitioners.”8
No one questions the real-world relevance of intelligence. If anything the problem has been
inverted: working to establish Intelligence Studies as a legitimate academic discipline. That
effort, however, has a bitter irony: Intelligence Studies the academic discipline often breeds
resentment from the very practitioners it is meant to help. This resentment, however, is not
6
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because the academy is of no use to practitioners. Rather, it is that the two sides too often
communicate in a manner that shuts down cooperative interaction and drives up animus. This is
the crucial lesson to take from this section: if the dilemma of under-theory is ever to be
overcome, then it will have to be not just empirically applicable but also part of the operational
quiver of the everyday practitioner. If such a theory, or theories, of Intelligence Studies can be
developed, then much of the practitioner bias can be surmounted. It would be a first step to move
current thinking beyond self-limiting analyses about what intelligence ought to be but is not.9
It would also be a respectful refutation of those who argue that the practical nature of intelligence
makes theoretical development inconsequential: this study argues that the maximum impact for
Intelligence Studies is not achieved going down a path paved by dentists and lawyers, where
PhDs and devotion to theoretical strength are unnecessary. Intelligence Studies grounded by
theory creates greater depth of empirical meaning and expands the consequential applicability
brought forth by hard-earned experiential learning. At its best, this is what theory always does
and it is why Intelligence Studies’ Ph.D. cousins (including International Relations, Comparative
Politics, and Conflict Resolution and Negotiation) invest so heavily in it. Given the various
problems hindering the development of Intelligence Studies at present, theoretical maturation
would only enhance the discipline, not hold it back. Making it more scholarly is not a zero-sum
game that results in the degradation of applied meaning and relevance. In the end, the discipline
must be acknowledged by both the academic and the practitioner, embracing theory and
empiricism eagerly rather than begrudgingly. That acknowledgement only comes through greater
interactive cooperation. If done, then Intelligence Studies will be more useful in the field and
more impactful on the Ivory Tower. Very few disciplines deftly accomplish both.
Prisoners of Preconception

Anyone who has worked through post-mortems on the Iraq war is familiar with the pitfalls
associated with ‘groupthink’ and preconceptions. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the few modern
examples of consensus across American partisanship:
“Of all the methodological elements contributing, positively and negatively, to the
Intelligence Community’s performance [in the Iraq war], the most important seemed to
be an uncritical acceptance of established positions and assumptions.”10
Some have argued such assumptions emerged from an administration not interested in counterarguments and alternative information. Others pointed to embedded preconceptions within the
Intelligence Community itself, making it impossible to jump off the analytical train once it
started rolling down the track. Both camps show the important compensating role academics
could play within Intelligence Studies: through formal training academics are meant to be
equipped with the techniques to look for and avoid such bias. While this is technically true, it has
also been documented that academic ‘experts’ can be just as much prisoners of their own

9

Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, “Escaping from American Intelligence: culture, ethnocentrism and the
Anglosphere,” International Affairs 88:5 (2008).
10
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assumptions.11 This is especially so when diving into the ambiguous and complex world of
intelligence research, where subject matter does not always neatly follow a particular theory or
exclusive methodology. Consequently, this work agrees with the simple yet elegant warnings of
Herrmann and Choi, who meant to refine analytical thinking and promote learning:
1) The temptation to relegate basic judgments about other countries to simplifying
assumptions must be resisted.
2) Abstract conceptions of power that are so multifaceted and multidimensional that they
have no operational traction must be relied upon less.
3) Experts, whether academic or practitioner, need to move beyond ‘factor wars’ designed
to show that one favorite causal factor is more important than another, concentrating
instead on the combined and interactive effects of multiple factors.
The need to avoid hubris is tantamount for it afflicts both communities equally. Jervis’ seminal
work on perception and misperception documented how policymakers tended to not subject
causal claims to rigorous tests but instead weighed firsthand experience more than they should
and engaged in sloppy searches for causes, typically grabbing on to topical events.12 Intelligence
analysts are meant to be trained to avoid such bias but it is clear from the first decade of the 21st
century that not every analyst or intelligence agency follows this code zealously. Not to be
outdone, some have rightfully pointed out how academic scholars can also bring their own
preconceptions to the table: it is not entirely uncommon to find the egocentric academic doubtful
that anyone in the intelligence community is capable of having a ‘rigorous’ idea. Swinging the
hubristic pendulum back in the other direction again, some have noted how getting academics ‘to
write tersely, to focus more on their findings and less on the preambular contextual backdrop,
and to venture future outlooks in their written assessments has often proved difficult.’13 In short,
both academics and practitioners need to think more carefully about their own analytical glass
houses before they lob stones in any particular direction.
Despite the already existing rules on both sides to avoid such thinking, preconception that begets
misperception that begets faulty intelligence analysis continues to afflict both academics and
practitioners alike. The only ‘remedies’ offered to overcome this problem deal mostly in
homilies, such as think smarter, put things together better, and stick with only the preconceptions
that are accurate. How to do any of this is left mostly unexplored, of course, except to advise
consulting people with alternative points of view.14 Indeed, perhaps the biggest preconception of
all is attitudinal. Instead of finding mutually enhancing connectivity, efforts seem to reinforce
working separately but adequately: academics can swing principles of academic freedom and
11
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methodological purity like hammers of condemnation, proclaiming their open source insights
more valuable and more accurate than classified materials, while practitioners can dismissively
note how academics often bend their own research rules in order to justify heavy financial
investments and ensure positive tenure decisions.15 These accusations are not absent foundations
in reality, and indeed could be subjects for their own individual research projects, but their
importance here is that they are hyperbolic and only exacerbate the interaction problem.
These problems only intensify in institutions trying to develop Intelligence Studies programs. A
small sub-group of institutions known as ‘military-friendly schools’ have long specialized in
degree programs catered to Intelligence Community interests. While not trying to disparage in
any way, a major problem has been a tendency to be too heavily imbalanced towards part-time,
adjunct ‘professional’ faculty. There can be no doubt that real-world experience adds depth and
detail to a program. When a program, however, is dominated by such, and when those
professionals serve only in an adjunct capacity, then the resulting program impact is negative.
The critical analytical thinking skills mentioned above are quintessentially academic and best
taught by terminally-degreed, full-time faculty dedicated to promoting them.
The even bigger danger: as more schools have tried to develop degree programs focused on
intelligence and national security, they have followed the military-friendly school model,
poaching retired IC professionals to fill their programs with adjunct, part-time faculty without
surrounding them in an academic setting. This dominance by practitioners-as-teachers has given
a false impression of harmony and an illusory conclusion that the best Intelligence Studies
programs need little participation from academic actors and no scholarly foundation. Degree
programs infused with professionals but not backboned by trained academics lessen the impact
of professional experience: instead of discipline-rich and theoretically-rigorous applicability,
programs are left with a decidedly anecdotal and conversational feel.16 Telling war-stories in the
classroom is indeed fascinating, but it does not adequately train the next intelligence generation,
whether they are scholars or analysts.
In sum, the three challenges to academic-practitioner cooperation examined here are by no
means an exclusive list of problems. The point was not to break down all possible obstacles.
Rather, it was to take three very basic but essential aspects of Intelligence Studies research and
show that even the most fundamental levels of collaboration and cooperation have significant
barriers to overcome. Intelligence Studies cannot move forward if the two communities that form
its bedrock foundation have problems settling on definitions, cannot develop rigorous theory, and
suffer from too many hubristic preconceptions. Regardless of whatever career aspirations
students of Intelligence Studies have, the discipline’s future success will be dependent upon its
ability to address these issues at a conceptual, methodological, and theoretical level while still
making a priority of empirically-oriented knowledge: those who think it are equally important to
those that do it and vice versa.17 The above challenges were formal and analytical. To assume
these as the most damaging for the long-term future of the discipline would be natural, but
15
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misplaced. For there are other challenges, informal and anecdotal, that might end up being the
sharper attitudinal Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of Intelligence Studies.

The Anecdotal Quandary: Informal Challenges to Cooperation within
Intelligence Studies
The Intelligence Side

This section deals with uncomfortable realities that do not lend themselves to quantitative study
or answer to methodological demands. This does not limit or reduce the impact such realities
have on the present and future state of the discipline, however. More importantly, few seem
willing to deal with these realities and address them in a sincere and probing way. That is why
the present work hopes to act as a conduit to help push forward a naked discussion about the
informal academic/practitioner relationship problems within Intelligence Studies.
Before diving directly into some of the attitudinal biases and experiential prejudice that can exist
between intelligence practitioners and members of the academic community, it will be easier to
offer an appropriate parallel: namely, the tension that exists between intelligence operations and
analysis. Many on the operational side of intelligence have always feared that analysts would
mishandle reports from the field and perhaps even reveal the identity of clandestine sources.
Analysts, for their part, have often mistrusted operations officers because they were often
deemed ‘devious.’18 This mistrust was further fueled by a thinly-veiled animosity where
introverted analysts bridled at the abrasive personalities typical of operations officers and
extroverted op agents snidely dismissed the so-called nerdy desk jockeys.19 Interestingly, this is
akin to the subtle disrespect between Comparative Politics and International Relations scholars in
Political Science. Many comparativists will joke how preposterous it is for IR theorists to think
they can understand how the world functions and what motivates nation-states when they are
usually so loath to look up from their desks to stop crunching numbers and determining
statistical relevance. If one wants to achieve a true understanding of how things actually work,
then one must be out there deeply entrenched. As the dismissal implies, only comparativists have
that passionate experience.
These splits parallel academics and practitioners quite remarkably. Academics on the whole are
indeed an introverted group. Even those atypical few who exhibit extroverted personalities rarely
compare to the assertiveness necessary to be a successful operations officer in the intelligence
community. This is not said as an insult to academics: it is simply an admission that what is
required to be successful in the ivory tower is not the same as what is necessary to be successful
out in the field for the intelligence community. This simple acceptance has transformed over
time, however, and morphed into disrespect from the intelligence side toward academics in
general. Scholars perceive this as an experiential arrogance that is damaging to a still-poorlydeveloped collaborative environment with academia. To be sure, these degrees of disdain will
vary from one agent to another just as from one academic to another. So while these groups are
admittedly not uniform monoliths, it still does not undermine the basic premise: the fundamental
barrier hurting the collaborative practitioner/academic relationship from the intelligence side is a

18
19

Arthur S. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle,” Intelligence and National Security 21:6 (2006).
Ibid.
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simple lack of respect for what the academic scholar does and how s/he goes about collecting
scholarly information.
Interestingly, if arrogance from experiential advantage often accounts for operations agent bias,
then information access is often culpable for intelligence analyst bias. While certainly not all,
there are nevertheless many analysts in the intelligence community who divide the world
between those with a security clearance and those without, between those who have access to top
secret information and those who have to ‘wallow’ in open source materials.20 Add to this the
fact that much of the writing within intelligence has to be more journalistic in style than formally
academic and it becomes easier to see why practitioners can find ‘rigorous scholarship’ to be
nothing more than long-winded pontification and simply not applicable.21 Allowing writing style
and resource access to predetermine value is a dangerous game that can be extremely shortsighted. Bowman Miller powerfully described the long-term consequences:
“[What intelligence practitioners and analysts] fail to recognize is how vast, complicated,
and interconnected the world of the 21st century is…Academic and other non-government
experts not only provide depth of vision and insight; they also, of necessity, can help
ensure some level of attention and monitoring on that huge array of countries and issues
which go relatively neglected by analysts and agencies focused on the challenges du
jour…Area studies specialists across the nation, most with extended periods of foreign
residence and teaching experience along with proven cultural sensitivity and language
capability, have their own networks of unpaid, but generally eager and forthcoming,
informants…For their part, on the other hand, government intelligence analysts may be
lucky to visit their overseas portfolios for two weeks every two or three years and are, in
many agencies, banned from communicating with or attending conferences involving
foreigners. They often lack the depth of experience, language skills, and cultural
Fingerspitzengefuehl of their academic counterparts.”22
There can be no doubt that such a thing as ‘classified-itis’ exists: it is the tendency to dismiss
reports not built upon classified information and not vetted through trusted sources.
Consequently, this tendency can make the academic work of scholars seem valueless, as the
massive majority of professors do not have top secret clearances and do not base their research
on classified materials. It relegates their scholarship into a position of lesser impact and meaning.
I can personally attest to this mentality while creating the Intelligence Studies program at my
institution: several members of the intelligence community, comprising four different agencies,
asked whether it was even possible to teach intelligence when top-secret security clearances and
access to classified material would not be the admissions criteria for each student entering the
program. Even though segments of intelligence today work with open sources, there still seems
to be a ‘second-class status’ designation shackled to it by many.
This mentality misses the aforementioned inescapable fact of contemporary intelligence life: the
world has become too complex and varied for any one government, let alone a single agency or

20
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intelligence community, to monitor all of it continually and effectively.23 This means there is not
only a place of prominence for academics in the intelligence field: their place should in fact be
considered critical for the evolution of Intelligence Studies. They are already collecting the data,
pondering the problems, and attempting to predict future crises in the areas intelligence
professionals want to know about but might not have the personnel, money, or reach to invest in
properly. This place of prominence is further justified when examining the new research
standards being set for intelligence analysis by the Assistant Deputy for the Director of National
Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Standards:24
•

Properly describe quality and reliability of underlying sources

•

Properly express uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments

•

Properly distinguish between underlying intelligence and analysts’ assumptions and
judgments

•

Incorporate alternative analysis where appropriate

•

Demonstrate analytic consistency over time or highlights and explains changes in
judgments

•

Demonstrate relevance to US national security interests

•

Provide logical argumentation

•

Make accurate judgments and assessments

The hope in these standards is in how much they mirror elemental academic practice for scholars
who try to have an applicable empirical relevance to their work, for those who seek to have their
work impact policy and governmental practice. If intelligence analysts begin to assess their work
with a similar analytical and methodological framework as academics (and it seems the above
standards will begin to do that), then the relationship between them will be built not just upon
common subject interests but upon mutual procedural respect. After all, the strongest
collaborative relationships in academia tend to be established by scholars who have a theoretical
and methodological kinship, rather than simply a subject matter similarity. Such an evolution
would be a dramatic improvement from the intelligence side of the relationship. It would not,
however, entirely address the collaboration issues holding back the academic side.
The Academic Side

“When you talk to professors about [publishing intelligence-related articles in peerreviewed journals], they often say, ‘Well, I don’t want to study something as nasty as
23
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intelligence: these agencies are overthrowing governments and stealing secrets, and
sometimes even trying to kill people. I just don’t think it’s a very good topic to study.’…
In American values there is a widespread suspicion of secrecy, particularly government
secrecy, as somehow associated with bad regimes...After all, it is true that here are a set
of secret organizations that from time to time cheat, lie, and steal.”25
Despite the presence of scholarly journals emphasizing intelligence, the building of Intelligence
Studies programs, and the emergence of scholars who wish to focus on intelligence research, an
old and powerful prejudice still persists throughout the academic community toward intelligence.
Unfortunately, this bias has its roots in real history, epitomized in 1968 by Dr. Earl C. Bolton,
Vice President of the University of Cal-Berkeley and discreetly consulting for the CIA, when he
wrote that fostering deception about CIA involvement in university projects was justifiable,
noting that ‘the real initiative might be with the agency but the apparent launching of the
research should, wherever possible, emanate from the campus.’26 Even before that low point
there has been constant suspicion focused on any interaction between the intelligence and
academic communities. Some of the ‘lowlights’ include:
•

From 1955-59, Michigan State University had a $25 million contract with the CIA to
provide academic cover to CIA agents stationed in South Vietnam who performed such
jobs as drafting the government’s Constitution and providing police training and weapons
training to the repressive Diem regime.

•

In 1956, the CIA established the Asia Foundation, providing it with approximately $88
million in funding each year. The foundation sponsored research, supported conferences,
ran academic exchange programs, funded anti-Communist academics in various Asian
countries, and recruited foreign agents and new case officers.

•

The CIA started the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International
Studies in 1950. By 1952, the former Director of the CIA’s Office of National Estimates
Max Millikan became the director of the center. In 1955, the CIA contracted ‘Project
Brushfire’ with Millikan to study the political, psychological, economic, and sociological
factors leading to ‘peripheral wars.’

•

In the mid-1950s, professors at MIT and Cornell launched field projects in Indonesia to
train the elite of Indonesian military and economic leaders who were later behind the
coup that brought Suharto to power and left over 1 million people dead. The elites trained
at the Center for South and Southeast Asian studies at the University of California at
Berkeley.27

The point in highlighting this list is not to say it is perfectly historically accurate. Rather, it offers
a testimony to the power of perception: starting in the 1950s and intensifying through the
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Vietnam era an independent grassroots movement swept across college campuses, powered
largely by liberal faculty that found no common ground with the intelligence community.
More reasons were added on in the 1980s and 90s as to why the intelligence community and
American college campuses should not mix: these ranged from the belief that secrecy was
antithetical to academic freedom; objections about the IC’s supposed use of torture and
assassination; efforts to recruit professors and students; and the IC’s assumed long-standing role
in undermining democratic movements around the world.28 These arguments would remain and
form a new 21st century anti-intelligence eruption across campuses in the wake of 9/11, initiated
again by mostly liberal faculty suspicious of a perceived invasive push by intelligence agencies
into America. But in this emergence there are sharp differences with the past. If the past had
accurate assessments of intelligence community objectives and then extrapolated from them for
faculty purposes, this new era of indignation makes many inaccurate assessments and then
purposely exaggerates the ‘successes’ of the intelligence community on college campuses. This
is important to the present article as this manipulation powers a new generation of academic
suspicion towards all things ‘intelligence.’ Not dealing with it openly means an attempt to heal
the sickness from the academic side by treating the symptoms while ignoring the cause.
For example, the economic downturn of 2008 is seen as a fertile planting ground for the
intelligence community. The logic states that need breeds opportunism, as a scarcity of funds
leads scholars to shift their research questions and suspend ethical concerns about funding
sources.29 Quite simply, this is a financial exaggeration: most of the programs that have tried to
encourage university investment in Intelligence Studies have been just that - encouragement and
nothing more. It is true the intelligence community recognizes its need for new and talented
cadres. But it is not true that it has been dumping millions upon millions of dollars into various
universities all over the country in order to be able to dictate to them the nature of their
curriculum, the content of their courses, and rigidly direct faculty research agendas. It may make
for compelling headlines but it is not based on substantive evidence.
The Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence (IC-CAE, often scathingly
referred to as ‘Icky’) are another prominent example of this trend. Academic posturing states that
this network uses universities to train intelligence personnel secretly within existing programs.
Campuses that agree to alter their educational missions to such ‘intellectual outsourcing’ are
handsomely rewarded with funds from the intelligence community. The IC-CAE’s true aim,
therefore, is to ‘bribe’ universities with fellowships, scholarships, and grants if they adapt their
curricula to the political agendas of American intelligence.30 As the point of contact for my
university in a four-university IC-CAE union, the Great Plains National Security Education
Consortium, the description above bears no resemblance whatsoever to how the program actually
works. None of the four campuses see themselves as outsourced programs being used by
intelligence personnel. None have been ‘bought off’ with an intellectual quid pro quo, changing
existing curricula to mirror intelligence community agendas. In fact, the funds are fairly modest
and not tied to employment promises. The IC-CAE program is, quite simply, a rather tame effort
by the United States government to increase interest in an area of need. It has not resulted in an
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explosion of Intelligence Studies programs or created dozens of classes run by Officers in
Residence or forced faculty to lose research because it was deemed classified.31
Much of the academic bias percolating around college campuses today is dangerous simply
because of how ignorant it is. A few exaggerations here and there can be innocent mistakes. A
systematic approach that seems to foster the development of purposely inaccurate myths,
however, is something that needs to be actively engaged and defeated. There is no doubt that any
program that sought to limit academic freedom, forced students to pursue employment against
their will, or deceptively changed the university’s curriculum without review from standard
faculty processes, should indeed be a program shunned by every college campus. The
intelligence community today, partly because of its own financial stresses and partly because of
the aforementioned professional arrogance, does not have this as an agenda or objective. What’s
more, Intelligence Studies is slowly developing a legitimate academic reputation, sitting
comfortably alongside long-respected disciplines like Foreign Policy, Global Affairs, Security
Studies, Comparative Politics, and International Relations. The 21st century threat environment is
changing. The ways of war are evolving. The need for cross-cultural understanding is increasing.
All of these realities demand that Intelligence Studies have a place at the intellectual table for
both scholars and practitioners. To deny that seat based upon a negative historical legacy that no
longer applies or on a contemporary propaganda campaign that is not accurate is the real
antithesis to academic freedom.
Before anyone is tempted to dismiss such academic bias as the raving of extremist faculty,
representing but a small percentage, be wary: do not discount the possibility that the global war
on terror (GWOT) is as potentially generation-defining as the Vietnam War was for an earlier
generation of intellectuals. Whether it be legal discussions about the PATRIOT act, moral
debates about ‘black prisons,’ or ethical concerns over drone activity, there is certainly mental
fuel available for anyone set on undermining collaboration between intelligence and academia.
This issue also goes beyond partisanship: while many view the two terms of George W. Bush as
the foundation for newly-born cynicism toward intelligence, there are others who rightly point
out that many elements of the Bush national security policy were advancing initiatives first
begun under Bill Clinton. In addition, many aspects of the Bush intelligence doctrine have
continued under Barack Obama. It is therefore impossible to sweep these issues under a rug of
anti-Republicanism. There is a difference between recognizing the flaws in an opponent’s logic
and mistakenly thinking the opponent is irrelevant: the former will power progress in
Intelligence Studies while the latter will cause its regress.

Conclusion: Overcoming Occam’s Follies
For a long time it was just an interesting factoid that both communities within Intelligence
Studies believed in utilizing Occam’s Razor, that research principle of parsimony and
succinctness, only with academics following it in the traditional manner and practitioners
inverting the principle on its head. Regardless of how it was employed, both communities aimed
for the same intellectual end-game: producing powerful, compelling, concise explanations to
complex problems that impacted a maximum audience. Unfortunately, this quaint distinction on
31
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a logic principle was one of the few attempts to explicitly examine the differences and
divergences between the two communities, to contemplate why academics and practitioners do
not communicate better for their mutual intellectual and analytical benefit. As this piece has
elaborated, there are many more serious and immediate problems to engage than trying to decide
which intellectual direction to point Occam’s Razor.
The key for Intelligence Studies is to not let practitioner arrogance or academic ignorance get in
the way of true cooperation that has that rare possibility of being theoretically valid, empirically
important, and impactful on policy. Before that cooperation can begin in a truly substantive way,
however, a reality check has to take place: there have been attempts to explain the flaws, gaps,
and challenges facing Intelligence Studies intellectually, but not attitudinally. Several
distinguished scholars have scrutinized it from theoretical, methodological, and empirical
perspectives. What has been missing up to now, however, has been a willingness to ‘engage the
attitudes,’ to critically probe the experiential and mental biases endemic to both sides when
interacting with each other and, most importantly, evaluating each other’s work. Once each side
admits and overcomes its own tendencies toward prejudice and preconception, it will then be
more plausible to create partnerships based on mutual respect, intellectual freedom, financial
independence, and thoughtful curiosity. It is these partnerships which will produce the best
intelligence analysis and it will not matter if it is produced in the Ivy League or at Langley,
because the work will finally be speaking in similar research tongues and done by colleagues not
working at cross-purposes or through petty rivalries.
It is true there have been examples of collaborative success, but nowhere near the level that is
needed or possible. In real terms this means the academic community continues to miss highquality intellectual opportunities to investigate crucially important work in critically important
regions of the world while the intelligence community continues to be at risk of missing
historical tipping points that will ultimately be characterized as intelligence ‘failures.’ Working
together with common standards, shared methods, agreed concepts, and similar project end goals
is what will dramatically minimize these dangers. Make no mistake: in some ways overcoming
the attitudinal biases between the actors will be a much harder row to hoe than ameliorating the
lack of intellectual evolution within the discipline. This is why the present work does not name
names or make lists: that is a meaningless exercise, given the problems faced are widespread and
encompassing to the entire discipline. There are no bogeyman programs, rogue agencies, or
deviant scholars at which to point a sole accusatory finger. Rather, there is a need to face all the
biases, real and imagined, so that Intelligence Studies takes its rightful and unique place in the
intellectual pantheon. Only when openly addressing these analytical and attitudinal biases, facing
them head on, and eliminating them once and for all can Occam’s follies have a chance of being
overcome.
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